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Case No. 16810 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The above consolidated cases Nos. C-8326 and C-8984 
arose out of a partnership between James H. Harris, now deceased, 
and his son William B. Harris, appellant, and involve the ident-
ification of partnership property, accounting and the winding-up 
of partnership affairs. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial of the matters the court below made and entered 
a judgment determining the value and possession of the property of 
the - B. Harris Partnership, the disposition 
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thereof, determined that William B. Harris be ordered to pay to the 
estate of James H. Harris the difference between the valued amounts 
of the personal property held by the parties, i.e. , that William B,1 
Harris pay to the Estate of James H. Harris the sum of $8,243.50, · 
denied further partnership accounting, and declared that there had i: 
been a winding-up of the affairs of the partnership and that Willia1;· 
B. Harris had no further claim against the Estate of James H. Harri:; 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request that the judgment of the District 
Court be affirmed in all respects. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
James H. Harris and his son William B. Harris, hereinafter:::: 
referred to as "James" and "William", became partners in the oper- ... 
ation of a livestock and farming business in the 1930's, which 
partnership is herein referred to as the "Harris-Harris" partnershiJ::: 
Subsequent to that time the Harris' entered into a partnership 
with Wilton and Merrill Fidler, the "Harris-Fidler" partnership, 
which partnership was dissolved by court decree in 1970. William ~ 
subsequently filed suit No. C-8326 against his sisters and broth& -
alleging certain interferences and seeking damages and a restrainin'::J: 
order. In November, 1974, James intervened in that suit and claime'.:. 
"' 
ownership of certain lands that appeared on the records in Willid'~ 
name and certain personal property, and that William had defrauded ::.. 
'· 
him. In May, 19 7 5, James died and the probate proceeding (No· 3552, 
- ~ 
was filed (R. 3552 - p.3). In November, 1976, William filed his 
second suit, No. 8984, against the personal representatives of the 
estate for an accounting for the Harris-Harris partnership assets Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and for the winding-up of the partnership business (R. 8984 - p.8). 
The above three cases were consolidated for trial and 
were tried before Hon. Bryant H. Croft, who wrote a detailed memo-
randum decision, dated November 3, 1977 (R. 8984, pp. 110-90), 
which the parties stipulated would be considered findings of fact 
and conclusions of law (R. 8326, pp.62-61). Judge Croft's judgment 
dated December 14, 1977, based on the findings and conclusions 
determined that James and William were partners, that they were equal 
partners in the Harris-Fidler partnership, that William individually 
owned certain land and that other land was partnership land, that 
certain designated and described personal property was partnership 
property (R. 8326, pp. 69-62). The Court determined that the 
assets of the Harris-Harris partnership consisted of thosed items 
itemized in Appellant's Brief at pp. 4-5 together with those items 
fully depreciated in the partnership depreciation schedule which 
were on hand at the end of 1970; all Bureau of Land Management 
grazing permits; all property which came to James and William from 
the Harris-Fidler partnership upon its dissolution; certain 
cashier's checks; and certain lands in Tooele County. The Court 
gave judgment to William for $5,287.50 for William's on-half of the 
proceeds from the sale of certain grazing permits and directed that 
the cashier's checks be cashed and the proceeds be equally divided. 
All claims and counterclaims for money damages asserted by the 
parties in the civil cases and for attorneys frees and costs were 
dismissed. It was also ordered that: 
"6. All monies contained in the James H. Harris 
bank accounts as testified to by Genave H. Tanner 
including those funds transferred by be before the 
death of James H. Harris, shall be accounted for 
by the co-executrices in the probate estate. 
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"7. That the claims of the Estate of James Henry 
Harris, Deceased, against William B. Harris and the 
claims of William B. Harris against the Estate of 
James H. Harris for an accounting for income received 
from the farming and sheep businesses conducted by 
the partnership through the years 1972 to 1974, 
inclusive, are dismissed, as the income tax returns 
show that the partners had approximately equal receipts. 
"8. Only one-half of the assets that came out of 
the Harris-Fidler partnership and one-half of the 
assets of hte James Henry Harris and William B. Harris 
partnership, are assets of the estate of James Henry 
Harris, deceased, and are subject to probate, and none 
of the interest of William B. Harris in such partnership 
assets are subject to the obligations or expenses of 
said estate." (R. 8326, p.64) 
It is significant to note that the trial on the above matter was 
held July 6, 1977, two years after the death of James. That trial 
specifically determined the assets of the Harris-Harris partnership 
as shown above. No appeal was taken from Judge Croft's judgment. 
In July, 19 7 8, William filed a motion in the consolidated 
cases as mentioned in Appellant's Brief at pp. 6-7 seeking various: 
forms of relief. In September, 1978, the respondents filed their 
objections to William's motion (R. 8984, pp. 129-126) and filed 
a list of items of personal property in the possession of the 
Estate of James (R. 8984, pp. 132-130). 
The motions were set for trial before the Honorable David: 
Winder and trial was held June 19 & 20, 1979. At the outset of the: 
trial counsel for Appellant indicated that he sought at the heari~~ 
to wind-up the partnership affairs (Trans. p.3) and complete the 
areas unresolved by Judge Croft's earlier decision (Trans. P· 4). 
Counsel for the respondents urged that all areas unresolved by the ' 
earlier decision other than those specifically identified by Judge · 
Croft as reserved for later determ;,....,,,.+-;,...,.... T.T,..... ..... ,.., ..;,,,:i; t"'::lt'~ so Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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that with the exception of the 1971 depreciation schedule all 
accounting had been completed (Trans. pp. 6-14). 
Initially, the Court disagreed with respondents' contention 
and allowed evidence to come in (Trans. pp.14-116). After further 
review of Judge Croft's earlier decision, Judge Winder reversed 
himself and ruled that: 
" [I] t appears to me that all we ought to be concerned 
with as far as the partnership is concerned is the 
property listed on the Depreciation Schedules in 1971. 
As you know, he listed the 1970 and '71 Depreciation 
Schedules and then he indicated that purchased in 1971 
and on the '71 schedule were five other items. And 
then at page 7 of his decision, he says that any 
personal property formerly included in the Depreciation 
Schedules that had been fully depreciated by 1970 
would also be partnership property. 
"So in other words, it seems to me that all we are 
talking about, really, is what is listed on the 
Depreciation Schedules plus personal property fully 
depreciated prior thereto. And he specifically said 
that the $5,287.50 settled it, squared the account 
through 1974." (Trans. 6/19/79, p. 117) 
Judge Winder than inquired of counsel for Appellant whether "we 
are here on the probate estate?" (Trans. p.117), which was responded 
to affirmatively, whereas Appellant in his Point 2 denies that the 
court had jurisdiction to make the ruling regarding the probate 
estate. 
The judgment appealed from, that of Judge Winder dated 
November 8, 1979, held that Judge Croft had determined the assets 
of the partnership to be accounted for were those as referred to 
in the quotation from the transcript above and declared that the 
property~listed in Paragraph l.a. of the Judgment was in the poss-
ession of William and had a value of $13,080.00, was Harris-Harris 
partnership property, and that William has the right to retain 
possession of the listed items; declared that the property listed Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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in Paragraph l.b. of the Judgment was in the possession of the 
James H. Harris Estate and had a value of $3,540.00, was Harris-
Harris partnership porperty, and the the Estate has the right to 
retain possession of those listed items; and declared that the 
final distribution from the winding-up of the Harris-Harris part-
nership be made by William paying to the Estate of James the sum 
of $8,243.50 (R. 8326, pp.106-102). Judge Winder ordered that 
the Harris-Harris partnership is, quoting from paragraph 7, 
" ... hereby terminated, wound up and the assets 
consisting of real and personal property are hereby 
fully and completely designated and distributed to 
the partners, their heirs and assigns. This term-
ination and distribution of all partnership property 
both real and personal is inclusive of all the 
proceeds of the Harris-Fidler Partnership terminated 
in 1970, which proceeds are included in the distrib-
ution of the partnership property of James H. Harris 
and William B. Harris. 
"8. William B. Harris, as a partner and on behalf of 
his partnership interest in the Harris-Fidler Partner-
ship and in the James H. Harris and William B. Harris 
Partnership, shall have no further claim whatsoever 
on the Estate of James H. Harris; his partnership in-
terests being fully adjudicated and determined in this 
Court proceeding and the prior proceeding before 
Judge Bryant H. Croft, on July 6, 1977, whose decision 
was filed on or about November 3, 1977." (R.8326, p.103) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE . COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECLARING AND DETERMINING THAT •• 
THE ASSETS OF THE HARRIS-HARRIS PARTNERSHIP, INCLUDING THE PROCEEDS 
FROM THE HARRIS-FIDLER PARTNERSHIP, HAVE BEEN FULLY AND COMPLETELY. 
DESIGNATED AND DISTRIBUTED AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN A WINDING-UP 
OF THE AFFAIRS OF THE HARRIS-HARRIS PARTNERSHIP. 
Judge Croft's 1977 judgment is res judicata as to the 
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determination of the assets held and to be accounted for in the 
Harris-Harris partnership. Judge Croft's judgment was had on both 
complaints brought by William Harris, the appellant herein. The 
Complaint in Civil No. 8984 sought a determination of the real and 
personal property of the Harris partnerships, for an accounting, 
for damages, for a stay in the proceedings of the James H. Harris 
Estate pending determination of estate and partnership assets, for 
damages and for other relief (R.8984, pp. 8-1). The Complaint in 
Civil No. 8326 sought an accounting by the respondents for part-
nership activities, a restraining order and damages. The complaints 
were brought in 1976 and 1974, respectively. Trial was had on the 
consolidated cases in 1977 before Judge Croft, James having earlier 
intervened and the probate case being consolidated (R.8326, pp.69-
and R.3552, p.168) 
63)j (In the probate proceeding, William contested the will of 
James alleging undue influence on the part of the respondents (R. 
3552, pp. 9-6). William and the respondents herein engaged in 
discovery of each other's positions and facts (R.3552, pp. 16-18; 
31-37; 59-64; 38-44; 45-58; 75-85; 65; 111; 263; 264; 265; 266; 
and 267 {pp. 263-267 represent individual depositions, see index 
to probate file)). On September 23, 1976, the Special Administrator 
of the James Harris Estate files a listing of receipts and expendi-
tures in behalf of the estate (R.3552, pp. 141-127). Demand for 
Notice was filed by Appellant in the probate file on or about 
July 6, 1977 (R.3552, p. 170). Thereafter, on or about April 9, 
1979, Respondents filed and served its "Petition for Determining 
Heirship" (R. 3552, p. 200-195) and Notice of Hearing therefore 
(R.3552, pp. 194-193). William filed his response thereto 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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(R.3552, p. 204) and the probate file otherwise shows activity 
and familiarity on the part of all concerned with this appeal.) 
The Appellant framed the issues in the case before 
Judge Croft regarding the assets of the partnership. Judge 
Croft specifically ruled "That the assets of the partnership~ ... 
the items listed in Paragraph l.a. through e. of his judgment 
(R.8326, pp.68-66). This case presents a circumstance where the 
same parties are involved, the same causes of action, issues that 
were litigated in a prior action and in which judgment thereon 
was rendered and the Appellant should not be allowed to raise 
issues which were or should have been raised in the former action. 
Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971). 
Judge Winder properly rejected evidence regarding matters that were:: 
or should have been raised in the earlier action before Judge Croft. 
This includes evidence regarding assets already mentioned herein 
and those other assets -as mentioned in Appellant's Brief at pp. 8-9i. 
Testimony was given at the trial before Judge Winder 
regarding the bank accounts mentioned by Judge Croft. It should 
be particularly noted that Judge Croft did not include the funds 
held at any time in bank accounts as partnership assets. His Ord~ 
was that those funds were to be "accounted for". That does not 
mean that Appellant William Harris has, has had or may have or have 
had any interest or claim whatsoever to those funds. The order 
requires only that an accounting be made in the probate estate. 
At the trial before Judge Winder, Grace McPhie·testified regardi~ ~ 
the bank accounts and was cross-examined by counsel for Appellant 
(Trans. 6/19/79, pp.77-86). 
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The Respondents alternatively allege in support of 
the judgment rendered by Judge Winder that (1) such accounting 
as was required by Judge Croft's decision was made at the trial 
before Judge Winder, or (2) that the accounting as demanded by 
Appellant is premature. 
1. The accounting has been made. The parties agreed 
at the outset of the Winder trial that all three cases, including 
the probate case, were b~fore the court at that time and that it 
was the desire of the parties to have all matters regarding the 
partnership resolved at that hearing, as mentioned and referred to 
earlier in this brief. Respondents were examined regarding the bank 
accounts and no evidence was adduced that the funds that were in 
or had been in any of the accounts were partnership funds. While 
it appears from the transcript that Appellant probably would have 
taken additional testimony regarding those accounts had Judge 
Winder not reversed himself on the scope of the trial, Appellant 
nevertheless failed to make a record showing in any manner that 
the accounts were partly or wholly partnership funds and this Oourt 
must therefore rule on what is in the record and upon the judgment 
rendered, which by implication denies any right, title or interest 
in the said funds to the Appellant,· the Court having determined 
apparently that either by the evidence presented, or by Appellant's 
failure to produce other or additional evidence, or that by Judge 
Croft's decision any such funds were not part of the partnership's 
assets. (It may also be noted that no proffer of evidence was made 
regarding the funds by Appellant so as to have a fully informed 
court and preserve the point on appeal. See, e.g., Cameron v. Boone 
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2. The demanded accounting is premature. As mentioned, 
Judge Croft's Order was that there be an accounting made in the 
probate estate. If the trial before Judge Winder is not deemed 
to have met that requirement in spite of the representations and 
desires of counselr then it must be seen that the matters before 
Judge Winder were for a determination of partnership assets only, 
was only a preliminary step in determining what assets were in 
the Estate so that a later accounting could be made and was not 
the probate action wherein the accounting was to be rendered. 
The Appellant claims, beginning at page 17 of his brief: 
"The winding of [sic] the Harris-Harris partnership affairs 
has been irregular and contrary to law from the beginning." 1 
Appellant has not at any time in the courts below made such a cla~ 
nor in any manner relied on, mentioned or alleged the statutes and :~ 
case law presented in his brief on appeal. It is well-settled that'1: 
matters not raised in trial cannot be considered on appeal. ~ ., 
by and through Road Commission v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 
817. What does appear clearly is that at James' death in May, 
.1975, dissolved such partnership as may have existed theretofore 
between James and William. Utah Code Ann. §48-1-28(4), which 
restates the common-law rule that absent a contrary agreement, a 
partnership is dissolved by the death of a partner. No contrary 
agreement has ever been alleged or proved. The subsequent judgment 
have specified the extent of partnership assets and properly "wou~ 
up" the partnership. The judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed as to that winding-up of affairs and distribution decree. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT WILLIAM 
" ... SHALL HAVE NO FURTHER CLAIM WHATSOEVER ON THE 
ESTATE OF JAMES H. HARRIS." 
William B. Harris, Appellant herein, made and filed a 
"Withdrawal of Objections and Waiver of Interest" purporting to 
waive any and all objections to the interpretation of the James H. 
Harris will, to the determination of heirship, of any interest 
in the will of James H. Harris or to take as an heir pursuant to 
the terms and conditions of that will, to further proceedings in 
regard to the probate of the will or the accounting thereof, 
excepting his interest as a Creditor/Claimant pursuant to the 
terms and conditions of his claim against the Estate of James H. 
Harris subsequent to a trial on July 6, 1977, for the consolidated 
cases of Civil No. 8326, Civil No. 8984, and Probate No. 3552 
(R. 3552, pp. 207-206). That waiver appears to be in accord with 
the judgment of the Court and should be dispositive of the matter. 
In the event, however, that the waiver is not dispositive, 
Respondents argue as follows. The language used in an opinion 
must be read in light of the problems addressed therein. Nielson's 
Estate v. Nielson, 107 Utah 564, 155 P.2d 968, 972. Judge Winder's 
Order reads as follows: 
"8. William B. Harris, as a partner and on behalf of 
his partnership interest in the Harris-Fidler Partnership 
and'in the James H. Harris and William G. Harris partner-
ship, shall have no further claim whatsoever on the estate 
of James H. Harris; his partnership interests being fully 
adjudicated and determined in this Court proceeding and 
the prior proceeding before Judge Bryant H. Croft, on 
July 7, 1977, whose decision was filed on or about 
November 3, 1977.. (R. 8326, p. 103) (Emphasis added). 
This cl9arlv 1A~vA~ nnAn ~nv claims William may have that do not Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah St te Library. 
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arise out of the partnerships mentioned and it is simply a restate· 
ment of the other provisions of the judgment determining interests 
of the parties and winding up the affairs. Further, it is con-
sistent with the Court having received the accounting of the bank 
deposit funds or with a determination that those funds were not 
partnership property. Judge Winder was clearly apprised of Judge 
Croft's decision as he mentions many times throughout the arguments,. 
On Appellant's hearing on his Objections of Draft Order of 
Accounting, Distribution and Termination of October 29, 1979, 
(Trans. 10/29/79) the Court again mentioned that it had read and 
re-read Judge Croft's Order and that the few issues left by Judge 
Croft had been dealt with at the June, 1979, trial before Judge 
Winder. Judge Winder stated that: 
"[W]hat I intended to do, and this is such a complex 
matter and I know nobody is satisfied but we can't litigat( 
it time after time after time, and I 've gone back and read 
Judge Croft's decision again today, or partially read it, 
and I had read it about three or four times, and I reiter-
ated again and again at the June 19th-20th hearing that 
I thought there were just a few issues that had been left 
by Judge Crofte It was my idea that they were dealt wiW 
on June 19th and 20th, and the only sense in which I 
think the probate matter remains open is simply that--
that I wasn't dealing with the probate matter in the sense 
of decreeing the distribution but I certainly--i t was not 
my intention that you [Appellant herein] come back now 
in the probate matter. And if it hasn't been decided a~ 
relitigated in the probate matter, what I decided ~t the 
19th and 20th trial, because that was the opportunity W 
try all of these issues about the partnership and whether 
hay or wheat or equipment or anything else belonged. And 
as Judge Croft noted when he decided this and as was so 
apparent to me, to go back and try and reconstruct thi~S 
in this complicated situation after years have gone by 
and memories have faded and records are gone, it is 
virtually an impossibility. And I'll be the first to 
acknowledge that maybe what I did at the end of the June 
19-20 hearing may seem a little arbitrary but I think 
there's such a great advantage to laying this matter to 
rest, and I tried to do it as fairly as I could. (Trans. 
10/29/79, pp. 17-18) Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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The effect of Judge Winder's ruling is not to cut 
William off from the Estate of James or to adjust the accounts 
of the probate estate with William but simply and solely determines 
that William has no further claims against the Estate based on 
the partnerships interests that William had. 
The Appellant alludes to §75-3-1001 as being ignored in 
the closing of the Estate (Appellant's Brief at p. 26) whereas 
the Estate has not yet been closed and the trials before Judges 
Croft and Winder were preliminary to the closing of the estate 
and necessary to determine what the estate consists of. The 
Appellant has had two separate "days in Court" to resolve the 
disputes regarding the partnership properties, has had ample 
opportunity to litigate its issues and should not be allowed to 
relitigate issues it did or should have properly litigated in the 
trials below. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed 
Respectfully submitted, 
HUNT, LAREW & KINATEDER 
\. 
\ '\ 
''.J'- . ,..--".._, r \. ~r-..., •;&~--...., 
MELVIN G. LAREW, JR. 
HOLLIS S. HUNT 
Attorneys for Respondents 
345 South State Street, Ste. 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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